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& INFORMED CONSENT
By: Kate Aizpuru'

I. Introduction
In 2005, South Dakota enacted some of
the most stringent anti-abortion legislation in the
country. 2 Among other restrictions, the regulations
included an informed consent provision that requires
the abortion provider to give the pregnant person,
"[a] description of all known medical risks of the
procedure and statistically significant risk factors
to which the pregnant woman would be subjected,
including ... [i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and
suicide" (the "suicide advisory"). 3 In July 2012, in the
matter of Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, the Eighth
Circuit held that the suicide advisory was, ''truthful,
non-misleading information relevant to a patient's
decision to have an abortion," and therefore was
constitutional under the "undue burden" standard
put forward in Casey. 4
This paper will argue that the Eighth Circuit's
decision subverts commonly accepted informed
consent standards by endangering a patient's ability to
make intelligent and autonomous decisions regarding
their treatment options. The paper will further explain
how the misleading information that South Dakota
physicians are now required to give will damage
the concept of informed consent at the expense of
accurate advice, specifically tailored medical advice.
This paper will also explain how the Eighth Circuit
arrived at the opposite conclusion by exploring
how the Eighth Circuit's decision endorses the
promulgation of highly ideological laws that promote
the state's preference for childbirth at the expense of
actual informed consent. The paper will further argue
that the decision creates a problematic precedent for
doctors and patients - in both the context of abortion
and the doctor-patient relationship generally.
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First, the suicide advisory damages informed
consent in South Dakota by requiring the physician
to give the patient information that is misleading.
Second, the Eighth Circuit's decision endorses the
promulgation of highly ideological laws that promote
the state's preference for childbirth at the expense of
actual informed consent. Informed consent standards
are intended to allow a patient, in evaluating her
medical choices, to make an intelligent, autonomous
decision. Thus, informed consent becomes
illusory, because the consent given is predicated on
information that may be misleading, confusing or
otherwise irrelevant to the specific patient.

II. The Suicide Advisory is Damaging to
Informed Consent in South Dakota
The suicide advisory hinders informed
consent because it is misleading, and is likely
irrelevant in most cases. The purpose of informed
consent rules is to ensure that patients are aware of
all information material to their healthcare, are fully
able to evaluate their medical choices, and allow
them to make intelligent choices while protecting
their individual interests. 5 Salgo v. Leland Stanford
Jr. University, the first American case to employ
the term, concluded that physicians must provide
the information necessary for a patient to make
an "intelligent decision" about treatment. 6 The
information required by informed consent standards
is typically factual in nature and directly relevant to
the patient's medical circumstances. 7 A provision of
such information gives the patient the ability to weigh
her own interests, values and preferences against the
risks and benefits she would likely face via different
treatment options. 8 In doing so, the informed consent
standard promotes a patient's autonomy and right to
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self-determination.'J The Eighth Circuit's decision,
requiring physicians to provide the suicide advisory,
is damaging to the standard of informed consent
because it unreasonably violates a patient's ability to
make well-informed, intelligent choices about their
treatment and compromises the decision-making
autonomy of patients.
First, the informed consent statute is
misleading. In contrast to the information provided
in informed consent statements, the suicide advisory
is misleading because it implies causation between
abortion and suicide despite the fact that proof of
such a relationship does not exist. 10 The advisory and
the opinion are premised on research demonstrating
a correlation between abortion and relative risk of
suicide. A correlation is different from causation.
Correlation describes a relationship where two variables
are related such that if the value of one changes, the
other changes at the same rate. 11 Causation, on the
other hand, indicates that one event is the result of
the occurrence of the other event. 12 A correlation can
be created by causation, but the two variables are not
necessarily related in that way. 13 For example, smoking
is correlated with alcoholism: people who smoke are
also likely to be alcoholics. 14 However, smoking does
not cause alcoholism. 15 The term "relative risk" is
another way to describe a correlation. Thus, while
some research (which is heavily disputed, as I will
discuss below) shows a correlation between abortion
and relative risk of suicide (i.e. that women who
obtain abortion care are more likely to commit suicide
than other women), or a relative risk of suicide among
women who obtained an abortion, the presence of
that correlation does not necessarily mean that the two
variables-abortion and suicide-are causally related.
Moreover, in addition to obfuscating the difference
between correlation and causation, the advisory is
further misleading because physicians are required to
provide it even in cases where it may be inapplicable. 16
In order to argue that the suicide advisory
disclosure is not misleading, South Dakota submitted
various studies that demonstrated a correlation
between abortion and suicide.17 Although experts
have criticized the results of most of the studies for
flaws in methodology, 18 according to the Eighth
Circuit, the presence of a correlation is sufficient to
conclude that the suicide advisory is truthful. 19 Judge
Gruender, writing for the majority, concluded that
when the statute requires physicians to discuss an
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"increased risk," that term refers only to "a relatively
higher probability of an adverse outcome in one
group compared to other groups-that is, to 'relative
risk.'" 20 His interpretation of the term "increased risk"
relied on the use of the term in the technical, scientific
literature submitted into evidence by proponents
of the law. 21 He then concluded that the contextual
definition of "relative risk" does not require proof
of causation, at least as it pertained to the materials
provided by supporters of the suicide advisory. 22
Judge Gruender's analysis of relative risk is
problematic for several reasons. First, by imputing
into the suicide advisory a technical definition of
"increased risk" which does not imply causation, the
Eighth Circuit disregarded the importance of lay
understanding in evaluating whether the advisory
is misleading. The majority opinion read "increased
risk" to mean "risk in a medical context. " 23 The
medical definition the majority decided upon was
relative risk, which, as noted above, merely implies
correlation, not causation. 24 However, the language
of the statute does not require the physician to refer
to "relative risk" or "risk in the medical context;"
to inform the patient that "risk" refers only to a
correlation or association, or to otherwise advise
patients on the meaning of "increased risk." The
suicide advisory simply requires that physicians
specifically inform all women seeking abortion that
the procedure carries with it an "increased risk of
suicide and suicide ideation. " 25
The precise meaning of "risk" is left up
to the individual physician to clarify (or not) and
thus leaves wide open the possibility that a patient
will misinterpret the suicide advisory to imply
causation between abortion and suicide. 26 The Eighth
Circuit's decision assumes that, either the patient
will understand "increased risk" to indicate the mere
presence of a correlation or the physician will explain
the difference between correlation and causation. It
also assumes that, if presented with the distinction
between correlation and causation, the patient will
understand the distinction and make her decision
accordingly. It is common, however, to confuse
correlation/relative risk and causation, as evidenced
by the American Psychological Association (APA)
report cited by the majority, 27 which suggested that
research on the connection between abortion and
mental health problems demonstrated a negative
"tendency to confuse a risk and a cause. " 28 If such
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misunderstanding is common among professionals,
it stands to reason that the confusion is even more
common among average people. For a patient who
is unaware of or does not understand that important
distinction between risk-as-causation and risk-ascorrelation, the advisory is misleading. Yet neither
the legislature nor the majority in Rounds appeared
concerned with the possibility that a woman might
infer an erroneous causal connection after being
told that a "risk factor" of abortion is "increased
risk'' of suicide. If actual informed consent were
truly the objective of the legislature, it should have
safeguarded against such a potentially important
misunderstanding. Because the legislature failed to
do so, however, the Eighth Circuit should not have
upheld the statute because of its misleading effect.
Judge Gruender's next step in evaluating
whether the suicide advisory was misleading was to
characterize the evidence presented by both parties as
to whether abortion lead to an increased relative risk
of suicide. He characterized the available evidence
as showing "some degree of medical and scientific
uncertainty ... as to whether abortion places a causal
role in the observed correlation between abortion
and suicide." 29 However, there is "no proof in the
medical literature that abortion causes suicide," and
unfortunately for the women of South Dakota, the
Judge failed to consider the significant problems
with much of the research that indicated existence
of a correlation. 30 Researchers at the University of
California found that the study upon which Judge
Gruender relied "ha[d] fundamental analytical errors
that render its conclusions invalid." 31 One researcher
even characterized the study as "an abuse of the
scientific process to reach conclusions that are not
supported by the data. "32
In fact, the APA has found that "the best
scientific evidence published indicates that among
adult women who have an unplanned pregnancy the
relative risk of mental health problems is no greater"
if they have an elective first-trimester abortion than
if they give birth. 33 Other research supports that
finding. 34 The vast majority of abortions in the
United States occur during the first trimester 35 and
are a response to an unplanned pregnancy36-so
for most women, there is no such increased relative
risk. For other women, it is true that the some
women experience sadness, grief, and other feelings
of loss following an abortion. In an extensive review,
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however, of all the literature on the relationship
between mental health and abortion, the APA found
"no evidence sufficient to support the claim" that
where a person has both a history of abortion and
a history of mental health issues, the mental health
issues resulted from the abortion. 37
Judge Gruender's analysis suggests that
where some correlation exists, it is therefore ''nonmisleading" for a physician to imply to a patient
that causation exists, simply because a conclusive
determination on causation has not been made.
Indeed, the opinion stated that Planned Parenthood
would have to "show that any 'medical and scientific
uncertainty' has been resolved into a certainty against
a causal role for abortion" in order for the suicide
advisory to be held unconstitutionally misleading. 38
This position is outrageous for two reasons. First, it
would be impossible to prove or disprove causation in
the abortion context, because it would be unethical
to assign women with unwanted pregnancies to
abortion versus delivery or adoption groups and
perform a clinical trial. 39 Second, any number of
negative factors could create a correlation like the
one the court relied on. For example, the APA found
that "prior mental health emerged as the strongest
predictor of postabortion mental health", 40 meaning
that the Eighth Circuit's decision allows the state
to lend its weight to one side of a medical debate
- despite the fact that the chosen claims are based
on methodologically suspect data. 41 The decision,
therefore, is manifestly unfair to patients.
The majority went on to argue that the
statute is permissible under both Casey and Carhart,
and Judge Loken, in his concurrence, stated that
precedent required the statute to be upheld. 42 Under
Casey, states have wide latitude to require "the giving
of truthful, non-misleading information about the
nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks
and those of childbirth" 43 even if the disclosure
might "cause the woman to choose childbirth over
abortion." 44 However, the standard articulated in
Casey does not require that courts uphold ambiguous
statutes that confuse, rather than inform, decisionmaking. Moreover, it is true that in the wake of
Carhart, state and federal legislatures enjoy "wide
discretion to pass legislation in areas where there
is medical and scientific uncertainty. "45 However,
Carhart does not say that the legislature has the
power to compel physicians to warn every patient of
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a "known" risk, which may be understood to imply
causation where only a correlation has been shown.
Thus, the Eighth Circuit could have held the suicide
disclosure unconstitutional while remaining within
the boundaries of precedent.
""
As Judge Murphy's dissent recognized,
mformed choice is hindered" when a woman is
simply informed that suicide is a "known medical
risk" of having an abortion, "when the weight of
the medical research indicates the opposite and she
is not informed of the debate." 46 The statute forces
disclosure of a "risk which the medical record refutes"47
and obfuscates correlation and causation without
r~quiring clarification of the nature of the "risk" being
disclosed. If Planned Parenthood is correct that "it is
more plausible that certain underlying factors, such
as pre-existing mental health problems, predispose
some women both to have unwanted pregnancies and
to have suicidal tendencies, resulting in a misleading
correlation between abortion and suicide," 48 the
disclosure would be irrelevant in those cases where
the underlying factors are not present.
A further problem with mandated provision
of the suicide advisory is that physicians are no
longer able to provide their patients with information
specifically tailored to the patient's individual needs,
which could distort the decision-making process.49
~er Rounds, South Dakota physicians can no longer
tailor their discussion of the risks and harms of
abortion (and childbirth) to the unique situation of
each patient; instead, they must convey standardized
information that is likely to alter the patient's
understanding of her choices in favor of the statesponsored pro-childbirth position.so By mandating
use of the suicide advisory, the Court allowed the
state to inject its interpretation of the relevant medical
literature into the doctor-patient relationship and the
patient's decision-making process.s 1 Unfortunately,
misleading information of the sort provided by the
suicide advisory does not assist in intelligent decisionmaking; rather, it results in a violation of patient
autonomy known as "informational manipulation."S 2
Informational manipulation occurs when an agent
manages information in order to alter a person's
understanding of a situation and induce them to
do what the agent wants. Thus, it does not facilitate
autonomous decision-making on the part of women
seeking abortion in South Dakota, but rather hinders
the decision-making process. In this manner, the
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decision subverts the ability of women m South
Dakota to provide truly informed consent.

Ill. Rounds Creates Worrisome Precedent for
Informed Consent Laws Everywhere

Second, in upholding the suicide advisory,
the Eighth Circuit gave legitimacy and support
to a specific class of anti-abortion laws that are
designed to "unduly influence a woman's choice,
in violation of the ethical boundaries of medical
informed consent."s 3 These laws, known as "womanprotective" anti-abortion laws, are designed to outlaw
abortion on the premise that abortion presents
various harms to women. Woman-protective antiabortion laws are frequently justified using suspect
social science claims, religious mores, and anecdote
rather than empirical studies of abortion's effects on
public health.s 4 The suicide advisory is no exception;
in enacting the 2005 anti-abortion law, the South
Dakota legislature relied heavily on a Report prepared
by the South Dakota Task Force to Study Abortion.ss
Significantly, that report was later renounced by the
Task Force's chair, an obstetrician and anti-abortion
activist, for being "biased and opinionated" and "less
than completely objective and factual."S6
The precise type of woman-protective law
that Rounds upholds is the abortion-specific informed
consent law. All states already require informed
consent before a medical procedure (including before
an abortion), it is a process that has traditionally been
self-regulated by the medical profession.s 7 However,
many states have enacted additional informed consent
laws specific to abortion, mandating disclosures that,
like South Dakota's suicide advisory, "not only go
beyond what is required for other medical procedures,
but also include information that is inaccurate,
incomplete, or irrelevant to the particular abortion
procedure to be performed."SS As discussed above,
informed consent standards are intended to facilitate
autonomous decision-making in the medical context,
on the basis of relevant, factual information.59 Yet,
woman-protective anti-abortion laws, and antiabortion informed consent requirements specifically,
are not always designed to provide patients with factual
information. 60 Rather, the laws create "informational
manipulation," which, in this context, means that the
state manages the information provided to patients
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regarding abortions in a manner that may alter the
patient's understanding of their medical situation.
Furthermore, the information provided could affect
the patient's course of medical care in a manner
that may actually be inconsistent with the patient's
self-interest. 61
The functioning of the suicide advisory
provides an example. Without the suicide advisory, a
South Dakota physician is still required, under normal
informed consent standards, to provide the patient
with the information necessary to make an informed
decision about whether to procure an abortion. 62 If the
physician, in his or her medical judgment, finds that
the patient will be at risk for suicide or suicide ideation
following the procedure, she has a duty to inform the
patient of that risk. 63 On the other hand, if the patient
is not deemed to be at risk, the doctor has no duty to
inform the patient of the correlation between suicide
and abortion. 64 Under the suicide advisory, however,
the doctor must inform the patient of the risk factor
regardless of whether the patient is actually at risk.
When the information is no longer tailored to the
patient's needs, but instead reflects the state's interests,
the result is informational manipulation. The
information may lead the patient to conclude that
she will necessarily be at increased risk of suicide if
she chooses abortion (even if this is not the case), and
instead choose to move forward with the unwanted
pregnancy. 65 The state, of course, hopes to encourage
the pregnant woman to choose childbirth. 66 But her
choice to do so is not truly autonomous if made in the
face of misleading information deliberately intended
to influence her choice.
Abortion-specific informed consent laws have
sprung up all over the United States. 67 By upholding
the suicide advisory, the Eighth Circuit gave cover
to other required disclosures that might actually be
harmful to informed consent. When presented with
the opportunity to preserve the integrity of informed
consent and the doctor-patient relationship, the
Eighth Circuit took the side of state legislatures
across the country who wish to decide for doctors
and patients what medical information is material to
every decision related to abortion.
Of particular concern is the "no causal
relationship" standard articulated by Judge Gruender. 68
This new evidentiary requirement suggests that any
informed consent legislation could be constitutional
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as long as there is some demonstrated correlation
between the disfavored procedure and a risk factor.
Since the Eighth Circuit gave credence to the notion
that correlation necessarily shows the possibility of
causation, 69 it may actually be impossible for a plaintiff
to claim that such a statute is unconstitutional. In
the context of abortion-specific informed consent
laws, this could mean that states can now require
disclosures of other alleged "risks," including fear of
vacuums and other pseudo-scientific risk factors that
some studies purport to correlate with abortion. 70
As long as proponents of the law could demonstrate
some "medical uncertainty,'' defined in Rounds as the
possibility of causation shown by the presence of a
correlation, the required disclosure would not be
unconstitutional.
Yet, the holding of Rounds need not be
restricted to abortion. Indeed, the majority stated that
informed consent standards should not be different
just because abortion is concerned. 71 Thus, Rounds
may also hold serious implications for informed
consent and the practice of medicine more generally.
When the state decides that it can arbitrarily choose
which risk factors are important and which are not,
it violates the physician's autonomy as an expert and
provider of healthcare. 72 When the burden is on the
plaintiff to completely disprove causation between the
disfavored procedure and the chosen risk factor, the
task of removing politics from the examining room
becomes nearly insurmountable. This decision leaves
open the opportunity for any state-based information
manipulation in an informed consent setting. For
many, abortion may seem a unique enough procedure
to justify the state's influence on patient choices, but
the standard articulated by the Eighth Circuit could
easily extend to other more "mainstream" procedures.
This possibility should be of concern to doctors
and patients throughout the country who seek to
evaluate the risks and benefits of medical procedures,
including abortion, free from the interference of
politicians. It suggests that a state can inject itself into
the fiduciary relationship between doctor and patient
with the blessing of the federal judiciary.7 5 It gives
state legislatures permission to use any correlative
risk factor to influence medical choices, thereby
undermining the autonomous decision-making of
patients.
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IY. Conclusion
The Eighth Circuit had the opportunity to
protect informed consent while remaining within the
bounds of Casey and Carhart. Instead, the majority
opinion subordinated informed consent in favor of
an ideological law based on questionable science.
The decision is problematic for the women of South
Dakota, who will now be confronted with politicians'
determination that all women are at an increased risk
of suicide following abortion. It is also problematic as
a matter of precedent, because it gave federal appellate
approval to a type of informed consent law that has
very little to do with informed consent. Perhaps most
dangerous is Judge Gruender's requirement that a
plaintiff would have to prove no causation whatsoever
in order to make an informed consent statute
unconstitutionally misleading. This requirement
could potentially extend beyond abortion such
that any required disclosure could be permissible,
as long as there is some correlation between a risk
factor and a disfavored procedure. Rounds is a very
problematic decision for the women of the Eighth
Circuit, but also for any person who values a doctorpatient relationship free from the interference and
manipulation of government preferences.
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